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This paper analyzes housing market reactions to the release of previously unpublished 
information on school quality. Using the sharp discontinuity in the information environment 
allows us to study price changes within school catchment areas, thus controlling for 
neighborhood unobservables. We find a substantial housing market reaction to publication of 
school quality indicators, suggesting that households care about school quality, and may be 
willing to pay for better schools. The publication effect is robust to a number of sensitivity 
checks, but does not seem to be permanent as prices revert to prepublication levels after two 
to three months. We discuss this reversion in relation to the literature on behavioral finance 
and the concept of limited attention. 
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1. Introduction 
Public reporting of school performances is a feature of school accountability systems that are 
increasingly common across OECD countries (OECD, 2007). School accountability systems 
are primarily designed to create incentives for school leaders and teachers to provide good 
schooling. Proper incentives may be generated through financial rewards or sanctions based 
on some performance measure, but potentially also from increased monitoring by parents and 
taxpayers as a consequence of public reporting. Accountability systems may consequently be 
more effective if households have strong preferences for school quality per se. It is not clear 
whether this is the case. A large literature has investigated household valuation of school 
quality by utilizing housing market data. However, correlations between school quality and 
other neighborhood characteristics make identification of causal effects difficult. Moreover, 
even though many studies find average test scores to be capitalized into housing prices (e.g. 
Black, 1999), it is not clear that parents value school quality in itself (Rothstein, 2006). 
In this paper we exploit publication of school quality indicators to investigate households’ 
preferences for school quality. Based on the literature on the capitalization mechanism, 
initiated by Oates (1969), we expect new information on school quality to be reflected in 
housing prices if school quality is valued by households. The housing market in Oslo is well 
suited to study the capitalization mechanism because enrollment in public schools, which 
almost all students attend, is tied to residential address. Another advantage is high quality 
housing data that precisely bracket the timing of the ‘information shock’, allowing us to net 
out all effects of variables related to each school area that do not vary over time. Finally, the 
school quality indicator that we use isolates schools’ contribution from student composition, 
and is consequently well suited to investigate household valuation of school quality per se. 
To estimate the full capitalization effect of school quality into housing prices is beyond the 
scope of this paper. We do however follow Figlio and Lucas (2004) and apply an 
identification strategy able to identify changes in housing values driven by changes in 
households’ information set. This research design allows us to remove neighborhood 
unobservables that are likely to bias conventional hedonic price regressions. We thereby add 
to the growing literature combining quasi-experiments and hedonic price theory to value 
nonmarket amenities and public services, such as school quality (Black, 1999; Bayer,   3
Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007), air quality (Chay and Greenstone, 2005), airport noise (Pope, 
2008), and hazardous waste (Greenstone and Gallagher, 2008). 
Utilizing discontinuity design in combination with hedonic price regressions, we find a 
substantial short-term response in housing prices. The increase in average willingness to pay 
for school quality suggests that (i) households care about school quality, and (ii) publication 
of adjusted school results provided new information, valued by households. A differential in 
published results of one standard deviation yields a difference in housing prices of about two 
percent, ceteris paribus. Robustness checks strongly suggest that this is a causal effect of the 
changing information environment. To investigate the validity of our identification strategy, 
we run ‘placebo regressions’ at dates without any ‘information shock’ and very rarely find 
results as strong as those obtained at the actual publication date. We also analyze price quotes, 
set prior to publication, and find that the publication effect is not spuriously picking up 
unobserved housing attributes. 
While the impact of publication of adjusted school results on housing prices is very robust, 
the effect does not seem to be long lasting. There is no trace of the initial response after 12 
weeks. Our interpretation is that agents in the housing market, rather than being proper 
Bayesian decision makers, tend to focus on salient housing characteristics when deciding their 
willingness to pay. Being unable to keep in mind and evaluate all relevant information, they 
tend to focus on school quality when this is easily visible in the information environment. 
While we are not able to verify whether this conjecture is indeed true in our case, it is 
consistent with earlier studies documenting that investors may react more to news that is more 
salient (e.g. Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman, 1998; Huberman and Regev, 2001). 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 and Section 3 we describe the 
institutional setting and data, respectively. Our empirical strategy is laid out in Section 4, and 
in Section 5 we present the main results. Additional evidence and sensitivity analyses are 
presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Institutional Setting 
Compulsory schooling in Norway consists of primary education (grades 1–7) and lower 
secondary education (grades 8–10). Most students (98%) attend public schools operated at the   4
local government level. Private schools are either religious schools or schools that use 
alternative pedagogical principles. In addition to compulsory schooling, local governments in 
Norway are also responsible for child care, care for the elderly, and some other services, such 
as infrastructure. Local governments are financed to a large extent through block grants and 
regulated income tax sharing. 
All students are allocated to public primary schools by catchment areas within local 
governments, and there is very limited school choice for a given residence. It is possible to 
apply for transfer from one school to another, but this school choice is subject to availability. 
Pupils living within the catchment area are prioritized. There is no centralized registration of 
students attending schools outside their catchment area, but they most likely comprise a small 
share of all pupils. School catchment borders rarely change, and when they do they tend to 
affect only a limited number of houses.
1 
Some schools are combined primary and lower secondary schools, thus there is an obvious 
correspondence between catchment areas (which relates to primary schools) and school 
results (which only exist for lower secondary schools). In other cases students transfer from 
their primary school to a specific lower secondary school in the same area. There is typically a 
unique lower secondary school for any given primary school, but some primary schools pass 
students on to different lower secondary schools. Transactions in these primary school 
catchment areas are excluded from the empirical analysis. For the remaining observations 
there are unique mappings from residential address to lower secondary school. In the 
following we refer to this mapping when using the term catchment area. 
In the current analysis we utilize data from the largest local government (by population size) 
in Norway, Oslo. Oslo has 550,000 inhabitants and is the capital of Norway. The size of Oslo 
is 453 square kilometers, and can reasonably be thought of as one housing region and one 
labor market. People living in Oslo can easily commute to every workplace location within 
Oslo. 
At the lower secondary level, there was at the time of publication 48 ordinary government 
owned schools within Oslo enrolling 14,005 students, 22 of the schools are combined 
                                                 
1 This information was obtained through personal communications with municipality officials. We have not been 
able to find any written sources.   5
primary/lower secondary schools. There are a limited number of private schools, attended by 
less than 2% of all students, which are not included in our analysis. 
 
3. Data 
3.1 School quality 
Students are graded by the teachers at the end of lower secondary school, as well as on two 
external examinations. The average of these grades (grade point average) matter for entrance 
to upper secondary education. Traditionally, variation in test scores (or other performance 
measures) across schools has not been publicly available in Norway. In January 2003, grade 
point averages were published for the first time. Because student performance is determined 
to a large extent by individual background characteristics, this measure is likely to be an 
imperfect measure of school quality as such. 
On November 18, 2005 a new kind of school quality indicator was published for the first 
time. This measure aimed to provide a better indication of each school’s contribution to their 
students’ achievements by adjusting mean grade point averages for individual student and 
parental characteristics.
2 This measure of school quality received considerable media 
attention. Even though the general public was unlikely to fully understand how the school 
quality indicators were computed, the media presented the new indicators as ‘true school 
quality’. 
In the empirical analysis we investigate the housing market response to the 2005 publication 
of adjusted school quality, which we denote 
A
j Q  (for school j). We also control for the 
previously available unadjusted school quality indicator (published in 2003), denoted 
U
j Q . 
Both 
U
j Q  and 
A
j Q  are standardized by the (national student level) standard deviation of the 
outcome corresponding to 
U
j Q , to simplify interpretation. Thus the scale is comparable in 
terms of grade points. The scale of 
A
j Q  will be more compressed, reflecting the fact that 
                                                 
2 Specifically, these indicators were constructed as the estimated school fixed effect in a student level regression, 
controlling for a very rich set of family background indicators, as described in Hægeland, Kirkebøen, Raaum, 
and Salvanes (2004). As there traditionally have not been any registration of results before the end of lower 
secondary education, constructing value added indicators has not been possible.   6
variability between schools is greatly reduced when controlling for student composition. More 
important to note are the considerable differences between schools when focusing on school 
contribution to student performance. For the schools in our sample, 
U
j Q  and 
A
j Q  have means 
of 0.10 and 0.20, and standard deviations of 0.25 and 0.095, respectively. The national 
average for both 
U
j Q  and 
A
j Q  is zero. Appendix Table A1 provides unadjusted and adjusted 
school performance at the school level. Appendix Table A2 displays general summary 
statistics for our sample. 
The correlation between adjusted and unadjusted school quality indicators is fairly low. The 
coefficient of correlation at the school level is only 0.29 between the adjusted indicator 
published in 2005 and the unadjusted indicator published in 2003. There is a high degree of 
persistence over time in the unadjusted quality indicator; the correlation coefficient between 
results published in 2003 and 2005 is 0.86. 
3.2 Housing transactions 
We utilize a rich data set on housing transactions in Oslo from January 1, 2003 to December 
31, 2006. The original data set consists of 79,322 transactions. All sales records are resale of 
apartments. Each record contains information on size (square meters), construction year, date 
the item was listed for sale, price quote, date of sale, price, financial liability, and residential 
address. The residential address allows us to match transactions to school catchment areas. 
Out of the total number of transactions we are able to associate 66,063 with a unique lower 
secondary school where we have school performance indicators.
3 Furthermore, excluding 
observations with missing data, or observations with dates that seem unreasonable, we are left 
with 38,562 observations, yielding an average of about 185 observations per week.
4 This 
average masks an increase from 138 in 2003 to 182 in 2004, 201 in 2005 and 221 in 2006. 
Details of the attrition are given in Appendix Table A3. The main source of loss of 
                                                 
3 This attrition comes in part from incomplete residential addresses, making it impossible to link an address to 
any particular primary school, partly from ambiguity in information regarding the transfer from primary to 
lower secondary school. Furthermore, new schools were constructed between the publications and school 
quality indicators were not published for schools with few pupils or with large variation in the number of 
pupils between subsequent years. 
4 Specifically, we exclude erroneous data where the date of the price quote is reported to be after the date of sale. 
We also exclude observations where the time to sell is reported to be very high (above the 99
th percentile) and 
observations where the price quote is below 85% or above 135% of the actual price. Excluding these 
observations has a limited impact on the results.   7
observations is missing variables, especially date of sale and price quote. If this attrition is 
systematic, it may bias our results. We have no reason to believe this to be the case. 
Figures A1 and A2 (Appendix) illustrate the week by week variation in the number of 
transactions, the date of publication (November 18, 2005) being day one of week zero, 
indicated with a vertical line. There are large seasonal variations in the number of 
transactions. In particular, the number of transactions is extremely low around Christmas and 
New Year and also lower in summer and around Easter. Looking at the 13 weeks immediately 
preceding and following the publication, we see that the number of transactions is fairly stable 
at just over 200 transactions per week in all weeks before and the week including the 
publication date. The number then drops off, reaching a minimum around Christmas, and 
quickly recovers after New Year (the rightmost vertical line in Figure A2). 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for key variables, each at the school catchment area 
level. The average apartment in our sample is 66 square meters, built in 1949 and sold for 
NOK 1.81 million (USD 350,000). Although the sizes of the apartments in our sample are 
fairly homogenous, there is much variation in housing prices across school catchment areas. 
The average price per square meter range from NOK 16,400 to NOK 35,900. 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
The major challenge common to all studies investigating the relationship between school 
quality and housing values is to distinguish between the impact of school quality and other 
correlated characteristics. Because students with wealthier and more highly educated parents 
generally score better in school, schools with higher performing students tend to be located in 
more affluent and expensive neighborhoods. Thus, one will obtain upward biased estimates of 
the value of schooling if one does not control for neighborhood characteristics.
5 Several 
different identification strategies have been applied in the literature, e.g. Black (1999), Kane, 
Riegg, and Staiger (2006), Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007), and Fack and Grenet (2007) 
apply a ‘boundary fixed effects approach’, Gibbons and Machin (2003) rely on instrumental 
                                                 
5 Black (1999) and Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) demonstrate this effect. Boundary fixed effects 
substantially reduces the coefficient on school quality in hedonic price regressions. Bayer, Ferreira, and 
McMillan (2007) also find that subsequent inclusion of precise neighborhood control variables reduces the 
estimate further, by as much as approximately 50%.    8
variables based on historically determined school characteristics, Brasington and Haurin 
(2006) apply spatial econometric techniques and Figlio and Lucas (2004) and Kane, Staiger, 
and Samms (2003) investigate whether housing markets respond to publication of school 
performance ratings. Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2008) study the capitalization mechanism 
using panel data and also provide an updated review of the extensive literature. Most studies 
find that school proficiency tests are capitalized into housing prices, but weaker (or no) 
effects are often reported for value added measures. 
To our knowledge this paper is the first to investigate the impact of the quality of compulsory 
schooling on housing prices in Norway. However, Machin and Salvanes (2007) exploit a 
change of admission policy to identify the relationship between housing prices and school 
performance on upper secondary education (11
th to 13
th grade) in Oslo. Their findings indicate 
that households are willing to pay more to live in catchment areas of better performing 
schools. Machin and Salvanes use raw grade point averages as indicators of school quality. 
The identification strategy proposed here is similar to the fixed effects approach applied by 
Figlio and Lucas (2004). They evaluate whether the publication of ‘school report cards’ 
contributed to changes in housing values in Florida. The ‘school report cards’ make up the 
key part of an accountability system rating the school from ‘A’ through ‘F’, based on different 
student test scores. The school report cards are to some extent contingent on student 
characteristics, because to obtain the best ‘grades’ one needs to have fairly good results, not 
only on average, but also across different subgroups of students. Figlio and Lucas find that the 
housing market responds strongly to first time assignment of school letter grades, but weaker 
effects for subsequent publications. In a related analysis, Kane, Staiger, and Samms (2003) 
fail to find any effect of publication of test scores on housing prices using data from 
Mecklenburg County, North Carolina. Pope (2008) applies a similar strategy to investigate 
how a change in US “seller disclosure” laws impact the implicit price for airport noise in 
North Carolina and finds a substantial response. 
We model housing prices employing a standard form hedonic price model. The hedonic 
model is a revealed preference approach to valuing attributes of different products (e.g. air 
quality, school quality, crime) that are not explicitly traded in their own markets (the classical   9
contribution is Rosen, 1974). Specifically, we relate housing prices to perceived school 
quality, in our specification the latent variable 
*
j Q , by the following semilog model:
6 
(1) 
* log ijtw j w jt ij ijtw PQ α βδ ε =++ + + x η . 
In Eq. (1), Pijtw is the price, including financial liability, of item i in school catchment area j, 
sold at day t in week w. Neighborhood characteristics that do not change over time are soaked 
up by the school catchment fixed effects, α =  1 {}
J
j j α = . β =  1 {}
W
ww β =  is a set of week specific 
fixed effects, capturing general variation in apartment prices over time. In addition, we 
include the vector xij which includes apartment size and construction year dummies. η, α, β, 
and δ is a set of parameters to be estimated and εijtw is an error term. Because we observe 
multiple transactions in each catchment area at various points in time and our key variable of 
interest is at the school level, we adjust the standard errors for potential correlation in error 
terms within catchment areas.
7 
The main variable of interest in Eq. (1) is 
*
jt Q , capturing the general publicly perceived quality 
of school j at time t. We model these perceptions as a linear function of adjusted and 
unadjusted school quality indicators. These indicators are in turn functions of some 
underlying school quality, assumed to be time invariant,
8 but the perceived school quality 
may depend on the available information. We expect changes in households’ information set 
to lead to a reweighting of the school attributes reflected by the two quality indicators. To 
estimate these changes we interact adjusted and unadjusted quality with Dt, which is a 
dichotomous variable equal to one after publication (November 18, 2005). Thus, our 
empirical specification, to be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) is: 
(2)  log ( )
AU
ijtw j w t j t j ij ijtw Pa D Q b D Q α βδ ε =++ + + + x η 
. 
In Eq. (2) the effect on housing prices of the publication of the indicators will be captured by 
the interaction terms 
A
tj DQ  and 
A
tj DQ . Everything unchanged by the publication, including 
                                                 
6 Cropper, Deck, and McConnell (1988) study the choice of functional form for hedonic price functions. They 
find that a semi-log specification performs well, both when the model is correctly specified and when the 
possibility of misspecification exists.  
7 This is done using the cluster option in Stata. 
8 Thus, any systematic time variation in perceived quality will be attributed to the publication of indicators on 
school quality. Given the short time windows we study, we believe this assumption is not restrictive.   10
other neighborhood characteristics and school quality to the extent that this was already 
known prior to publication, is absorbed by the catchment fixed effects,  j α  . Our main 
parameter of interest is δ, which we expect to be positive. However, it is clear from Eq. (2) 
that we can only estimate δa and δb. We cannot identify δ without making assumptions about 
the a and b. These coefficients measure to what extent households perceptions of school 
quality changes when the information environment changes, and how these changes correlates 
with the school attributes reflected in the quality indicators. Assumptions about the 
coefficients of Eq. (2) translate into assumptions about what value households place on 
adjusted and unadjusted quality, before and after publication of the former. We believe some 
assumptions with testable implications are justified. 
Applying the hedonic price approach we cannot distinguish between general household 
valuation and parental valuation of school quality. However, it is reasonable to expect that the 
preferences of parents (or potential parents) play a key role in driving a potential housing 
market reaction to publication of new information on school quality. Ultimately, parents care 
about a wide range of outcomes for their children, including but not limited to educational and 
labor market success, well-being at school, and the friends their children make. This may give 
rise to a preference for good schools, even in the absence of any preference for school quality. 
Parents may value competent peers, irrespective of the schools contribution to the students’ 
achievements. This may for example be the case if parents believe peer effects to be strong. 
Rothstein (2006) analyzes parental valuation of school characteristics in the US and finds that 
school effectiveness is not a primary determinant of parental choice. He speculates that the 
explanation for this result is that: (i) schools’ contribution to student achievement is modest; 
(ii) parents prefer other neighborhood or school characteristics to effectiveness, e.g. peer 
effects or (iii) parents cannot distinguish effective from ineffective schools. 
However, no matter what are the parents’ preferences, if the indicators do not provide any 
new information, weights should not change (a = 0, b = 0). In this case school quality is 
captured by the model’s catchment area fixed effects and we expect to find a coefficient 
estimate on 
A
tj DQ  not significantly different from zero. We also expect this coefficient 
estimate to be insignificant if parents do not value school quality (δ = 0). This leads to our 
Hypothesis 1:   11
Hypothesis 1. If households value school quality, and the 2005 school performance indicators 
provided relevant information to them, the regression coefficient corresponding to δa should 
be positive. 
δa does not necessarily capture the full capitalization effect of school quality into housing 
prices, this will only be the case if households were ignorant about school quality before 
publication, and then accept the adjusted indicator as a valid and permanent measure of 
school quality. In less extreme cases, where there is only partial pass-through of the published 
indicator into perceived quality—either because the information is already partly known (and 
thus captured by the fixed effects) or because the indicators are not fully accepted as valid 
measures of school quality—our estimate of δa  will be a downward-biased estimate of 
household valuation of school quality, δ.
9 
The opposite argument can be made for unadjusted school quality: this information was 
already public prior to the 2005 publication, and was then supplemented, or possibly 
supplanted, by an additional measure. Thus, its weight should have stayed the same or gone 
down, implying that b ≤ 0. If the households do indeed have any preference for school quality, 
the weights will stay the same only if the indicators provided no new information, otherwise 
at least some emphasis should be shifted from unadjusted to adjusted quality. This is the basis 
for our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. If households value school quality, and the 2005 school performance indicators 
provided relevant information, which in turn made households attach less weight to 
unadjusted results, then the regression coefficient corresponding to δb should be negative. 
The hedonic price regression is estimated using the data set described in Section 3. Because 
unobservable variables affecting house prices are likely to be systematically correlated with 
the school performance indicators, we evaluate changes in housing prices tightly bounded 
around the publication date in order to remove all effects of variables related to each school 
area that do not vary over time. In the empirical analysis we use the exact date of sale 
                                                 
9 On theoretical grounds we cannot rule out that the weighting of the adjusted indicators decreases with 
publication, leading to a situation where favorable indicators may be negatively correlated with changes in 
housing prices. This will be the case if parents have an idea of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schools prior to publication, 
but systematically overrate ‘good’ schools and underrate ‘bad’ schools.   12
(agreement) and experiment with different time windows around the date of publication, 
ranging from 2 to 104 weeks (± 1 week to ± 52 weeks). 
Existing studies on publication of school quality indicators rely on monthly data and omit 
months close to publication. Kane, Staiger, and Samms (2003) match various indicators 
released in July or August to transactions in the subsequent September through August period. 
Similarly, Figlio and Lucas (2004) match information released in May or June to transactions 
in July to April in the subsequent year. This approach may be problematic for two reasons. 
First, because longer time windows are more subject to unobserved omitted variables or 
housing market trends that may bias the estimates. Second, because important short-term 
responses in the housing market may be neglected. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Price response 
Table 1 displays the results from regressions of log price on different sets of explanatory 
variables, based on transaction data from 2005. We notice a positive and declining 
relationship between the size of the item and log price across all specifications. Older 
apartments tend to sell for a lower price, relative to apartments built after 1999 (our reference 
category). The impact of construction year is nonmonotonic, e.g. apartments built before 1900 
receive a higher price than apartments built between 1960 and 1979. Week fixed effects alone 
explain only about 1% of the variation in log price. 
In line with the literature, we find that better performing schools tend to be located in 
neighborhoods with more expensive housings (e.g. Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2007). The 
results indicate a price differential of about 5–10 percent for a one (school level) standard 
deviation difference in school results. As stressed by the literature, this does not necessarily 
reflect a causal relationship, in the sense that housing prices are higher because of good 
schools. It seems quite likely that schools of different (observed and perceived) quality, and 
especially with different peer groups and thus unadjusted results, will be located in 
neighborhoods with different characteristics. This means that a naïve regression of log prices 
on school quality, not controlling for neighborhood, yields biased results that partly reflect the 
correlation between school quality and other neighborhood characteristics.   13
Table 1: Cross-sectional regression results, 2005. The dependent variable is log price 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Size    0.011 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 
    [29.61]** [34.65]** [29.47]** [28.47]** [27.25]** [26.96]** 
Year of construction:          
  Before  1900      –0.069 –0.092 –0.107 –0.114 –0.177 
      [2.09]*  [3.15]** [3.27]** [3.85]** [8.78]** 
 Between 1900 and 1919      –0.045  –0.107  –0.080  –0.123  –0.178 
      [1.51]  [3.57]** [2.54]* [4.08]**  [7.20]** 
 Between 1920 and 1939      –0.113  –0.155  –0.135  –0.165  –0.209 
      [3.54]** [5.55]** [4.39]** [5.90]**  [14.04]** 
 Between 1940 and 1959      –0.281  –0.297  –0.256  –0.280  –0.226 
      [9.20]** [10.65]** [9.71]**  [9.29]** [12.08]** 
 Between 1960 and 1979      –0.428  –0.423  –0.406  –0.409  –0.243 
      [12.02]** [11.53]** [10.95]** [10.28]** [13.30]** 
 Between 1980 and 1989      –0.275  –0.276  –0.238  –0.252  –0.164 
      [3.53]** [4.28]** [3.40]** [4.09]** [8.07]** 
 Between 1990 and 1999      –0.13  –0.129  –0.109  –0.116  –0.093 
      [2.79]**  [3.07]** [2.59]* [2.94]**  [3.94]** 
     0.418  0.378   U
j Q  
     [4.68]**  [3.96]**  
      0.734  0.469    A
j Q
        [3.05]**  [2.57]*   
          
Week  fixed  effects  Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Catchment  area  fixed  effects No  No No No No No Yes 
          
#  obs.  10457  10457 10457 10457 10457 10457 10457 
R
2  0.01  0.54 0.69 0.75 0.71 0.76 0.85 
Notes: Columns 1 through 7 report coefficients of OLS regressions. Absolute value of t statistics based on 
catchment area clustered standard errors in brackets, * significant at, or below, 5%; ** significant at, or below, 
1%. 
 
While the estimated coefficients on variables standardized according to grade points are larger 
for adjusted quality, the more compressed scale of this variable implies that the ‘effect’ of a 
one school level standard deviation is greater for unadjusted quality.
10 This is the case when 
the indicators are included separately in the regression (specification 4 and 5), and also when 
we include both measures (specification 6). In the latter case, the coefficients associated with 
both unadjusted and adjusted quality are somewhat reduced, but still of nontrivial size. 
Table 2 presents results based on our empirical strategy laid out in Section 4. We apply eight 
different time windows, ranging from ± 1 week to ± 52 weeks. Our inference is based on 
                                                 
10 This follows from the results presented in Table 1 and the fact that the school level standard deviations of 
U
j Q  
and 
A
j Q  are 0.25 and 0.095 respectively. Thus we find price differentials of about 10 and 5–8 percent for a 
school level standard deviation of the two quality measures, depending on whether we control for both 
simultaneously.    14
within catchment area changes in housing prices. If publication of school performance 
indicators provides new information to households, and households value this information, 
then housing prices should respond accordingly. 
Table 2: Housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators. The 
dependent variable is log price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















          
0.181 0.143 0.179 0.132 0.167 0.139 0.068 0.027  A
tj DQ  
[1.43]  [1.39] [2.29]* [1.73]  [3.05]**  [2.64]* [1.82]  [0.81] 
0.084  0.021  0.002  –0.019 –0.020 –0.024 –0.021 –0.028  U
tj DQ  
[1.70] [0.60] [0.07] [0.85] [1.00] [1.12] [1.67]  [2.57]* 
          
#  obs.  487  911  1281 1631 2804 5271  10968  21753 
R
2  0.89 0.88 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.86 
# obs. pre publ.  230  460  695  920  1845  3084  5675  10413 
# obs. post publ.  257  451  586  711  959  2187  5293  11340 
Notes: Columns 1 through 8 report coefficients of OLS regressions for different time windows. Absolute value 
of t statistics based on catchment area clustered standard errors in brackets. All estimations control for size, year 
of construction (dummies), week fixed effects, and catchment area fixed effects. * significant at, or below, 5%; 
** significant at, or below, 1%. 
 
A
tj DQ  is found to be statistically significant in regressions based on 6, 16, and 26 weeks 
windows, consistent with Hypothesis 1. We fail, however, to obtain a statistically significant 
effect for the narrowest and widest time windows. In every time window, however, we find a 
positive effect and the estimated magnitude is not very different for the narrow to middle time 
windows. These estimates suggest that a one (school level) standard deviation increase in 
A
j Q  
is associated with about a 1.5 percent increase in housing prices, all else equal. For the 
average apartment in our sample this corresponds approximately to an increase of NOK 
27,000 (USD 5250). This estimate is similar, but somewhat smaller, than earlier papers on the 
capitalization of school quality into housing prices report (such as Black (1999) and Figlio 
and Lucas (2004) for the US, Gibbons and Machin (2003) for the UK and Fack and Grenet 
(2007) for France).
11 Not only does our analysis suggest that households care about school 
quality, but they seem to respond quickly to this information, which must have been new to 
them. For the wider time windows, the estimated coefficients are much smaller and not 
                                                 
11 Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan (2007) find a smaller response than these studies.    15
statistically significant at conventional levels, indicating that there may not be a long-term 
effect. 
We do not find strong support in favor of Hypothesis 2. We fail to reject the null hypothesis 
of no impact of 
U
tj DQ  for dates closely bracketed around publication. We do, however, find 
some traces of a statistically significant negative long-term effect, but we are cautious in 
interpreting this as a causal effect because longer time windows may be more vulnerable to 
omitted variables and general housing market trends. 
5.2 Persistence 
In Figure 1, we plot estimated coefficients and t-values associated with all daily four-week 
periods, from six months before the publication date until six months after, comparing with 
two different prepublication periods. Looking at the evolution of the postpublication results, 
there seems to be a short-term effect lasting up to around two months, after which the effect 
disappears. The t-values are above two for almost all the four week windows; from the one 
starting on December 13 (and ending on January 9), to the one starting on January 2 (and 
ending on January 29), and afterwards always stay below two. The estimated effect is 
strongest for the period around 4 to 8 weeks after publication, and is for most of this period of 
a larger magnitude than the estimates reported in Table 2, yielding an effect on housing prices 
of about three percent for a one standard deviation difference in school quality. This 
illustrates that omitting transactions near the time of publication, as Figlio and Lucas (2004) 
and Kane Staiger and Samms (2003) do, a substantial short-term response in housing prices 
may be missed.
12 
Comparing the post publication transactions with alternative transactions preceding 
publication, e.g. September 23 to October 20, rather than October 21 to November 17, the 
results are similar. Thus, our results do not seem to be an artifact of the prepublication period 
used to make the comparisons. Furthermore, looking at the leftmost part of the figures, 
comparing the prepublication reference periods to other prepublications intervals, we estimate 
no strong or systematic effects, supporting the above conclusion. Figure 1 also provides some 
                                                 
12 Applying a time window similar to Figlio and Lucas (2004), i.e. omitting November and December, and 
comparing prices in January to October, 2005 with January to October, 2006, we get results very similar to our 
specification (8) in Table 3. These indicate no impact of adjusted quality, but some decapitalization of the 
previously published unadjusted quality.   16
evidence of a negative short-term effect of unadjusted test scores. This result is much weaker 
than our result for adjusted quality, but for some time windows the negative effect is 
statistically significant at the five percent level (irrespective of prepublication period), and the 
estimated coefficients for almost the entire six months after publication are below zero. 
Figure 1: Persistence of publication effect. The dependent variable is log price 
 
Notes: Figure shows the rolling time window estimates of coefficients (top panel) and t-values, from regressions 
of the publication effect on the valuation of the two quality measures. The values for each date are based on 
regressions using postpublication data from the indicated date and four weeks onwards, comparing this with one 
of two different prepublication periods, as indicated in the legend. Effects are also estimated at times before the 
actual publication (indicated with a vertical line). For postpublication time windows that overlap with the 
prepublication periods, or that do contain dates both before and after publication of the indicators, coefficients 
and t-values are set equal to zero. 
 
One interpretation of the price reversion observed relates to the cost of information 
acquisition. While potential buyers in late November 2005 are likely to have taken notice of 
the published school performance indicators, announced in several media, new buyers 
entering the housing market are less and less likely to have taken notice of the publication. 
The latter may find it too costly in terms of time and effort to acquire this information through 
the Oslo municipality web site. However, given our estimates of school quality valuation and   17
reasonable assumptions about time required to find the published school quality indicators, 
we find this interpretation incomplete. To complement it, we believe insights from the 
behavioral finance literature are relevant. This literature has pointed to several human 
information-processing biases that may explain deviations from full rationality. Because we 
cannot distinguish between different explanations, we can only speculate about biases that 
may generate the price reversal. One appealing explanation is the idea of limited attention, 
where cognitively overloaded agents pay attention to only a subset of publicly available 
information (Hong and Stein, 2007).
13 If this is a realistic description of how agents make 
decisions, it is likely to give rise to overweighting of information signals that are more salient 
at the expense of information that blends in with the background. In our setting, agents may 
exhibit a tendency to focus on apartment attributes that are more salient. After November 18, 
2005, the school quality related to each neighborhood becomes easily accessible. However, as 
the media turns its attention elsewhere, the housing market agents may respond by putting 
less weight on school quality, giving rise to the price reversion we observe. 
 
6. Robustness 
As noted above, we do find publication effects of reasonably consistent magnitudes for a 
range of different time windows. Furthermore, as is evident from our analysis of the 
persistence of the effect, our results do not hinge on the specific pre- or postpublication time 
window used. 
Nonetheless, we perform three more robustness checks: (i) we estimate the model excluding 
outlying observations, (ii) we estimate similar models for a wide range of (nonpublication) 
dates, to investigate whether our results reflect secular trends or omitted variables, and (iii) we 
study price quotes to control for unobserved apartment attributes. 
6.1. Outliers removed 
We rerun our main regressions, excluding outliers with a very low or very high square meter 
price. Specifically, we exclude observations below the 1
st and above the 99
th percentile within 
each school catchment area for each year. As Table 3 shows, this does not have a large impact 
                                                 
13 Several empirical studies find that salient news tend to carry greater weight in market prices. See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Teoh (2002) for a review of this literature.    18
on our estimated coefficients, or on the level of statistical significance. Actually, we notice 
that our main coefficient of interest, the one on adjusted school quality, increases in 
magnitude and becomes more significant in most of the short- or middle-width time windows. 
We have repeated this analysis also for other definitions of outliers, without our results 
changing much. 
Table 3: Housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators. 
Regressions where outliers are removed from the data set. The dependent variable is log 
price 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















          
0.194 0.146 0.192 0.144 0.166 0.126 0.067 0.033  A
tj DQ  
[1.62]  [1.49] [2.45]* [1.90]  [3.30]**  [2.66]* [1.79]  [0.96] 
0.098  0.028  –0.001 –0.018 –0.020 –0.014 –0.017 –0.023  U
tj DQ  
[2.01] [0.80] [0.02] [0.77] [1.06] [0.80] [1.31]  [2.03]* 
          
#  obs.  477  897  1260 1605 2755 5168  10763  21387 
R
2  0.90 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 
# obs. pre publ.  223  452  681  903  1813  3024  5570  10239 
# obs. post publ.  254  445  579  702  942  2144  5193  11148 
Notes: Columns 1 through 8 report coefficients of OLS regressions for different time windows. Absolute value 
of t statistics based on catchment area clustered standard errors in brackets. All estimations control for size, year 
of construction (dummies), week fixed effects, and catchment area fixed effects. * significant at, or below, 5%; 
** significant at, or below, 1%. 
 
6.2. Placebo publication effects 
For all time periods of specific lengths that contain no dates earlier that January 1, 2003 and 
no postpublication dates, we estimate artificial publication effects, and compare these with the 
estimated effect around November 18, 2005. If we found similar types of results in 
regressions based on artificial publications, it would suggest that omitted (local) trends, other 
omitted variables or wrong functional form led to the results presented above. 
Table 4 reports the t-values from the regression centered on November 18, 2005 and the share 
of estimated t-values that are larger than or equal to this. For completeness we also report the 
share of estimated t-values that are larger than or equal to this in absolute value. As is evident 
from the table, it is a very rare occurrence to find results as strong as those we get for the   19
actual publication date. For 12, 16, and 20 weeks windows we find well below one percent of 
the placebo t-values to be larger than the actual t-value at November 18, 2005.
14 
Table 4: Estimated “placebo publication effects” relative to the actual publication effect. 









|tplacebo| ≥ t18Nov2005 
(percent)  tplacebo ≥ t18Nov2005 (percent) 
± 1  0.181 1.43  20.89  8.85 
± 2  0.143 1.39  22.24  10.63 
± 3  0.179 2.29  6.23  3.36 
± 4  0.132 1.73  10.43  5.02 
± 6  0.154 2.54  1.34  0.62 
± 8  0.167 3.05  1.17  0.21 
± 10  0.203 3.93  0.66  0.00 
± 13  0.139 2.64  7.35  5.97 
Notes: Placebo publication effects are based on estimations from all dates from January 1, 2003 onwards, until 
the last date that does not include November 18, 2005. All estimations control for size, year of construction 
(dummies), week fixed effects, and catchment area fixed effects. 
 
6.3. Price quote 
Despite the apparent robustness demonstrated above, one may still worry about sample 
selection, i.e. systematic (unobserved) differences among apartments sold before and after 
November 18, 2005, which may be correlated with the published school quality indicators. To 
further investigate whether such an argument may bias our results we restrict our analysis to 
apartments with price quotes set before November 18 and investigate whether those sold at or 
after November 18 were sold at a higher price relative to the price quote than apartments sold 
before November 18. 
Most apartments are sold shortly after the price quote is set. In the first week after November 
18, 2005, 97% of the apartments had a price quote set before November 18. However this 
number drops to 40% in week 2, and 20% in week 3 and week 4. Consequently, the narrow 
time windows are of most interest in Table 5. As can be seen from the number of 
observations, extending the time window adds few observations sold after the publication, 
when we restrict the analysis to those transactions where the price quote is set before 
November 18. Still, for all time windows we do find a significant effect of adjusted school 
                                                 
14 We have also looked in detail at placebo regressions for November 18 in other years (2003, 2004, and 2006). 
We never find statistically significant effects for time windows bracketed around November 18 for these years. 
The exception is the longest time window in 2003 (± 52 weeks). Results are not reported, but available upon 
request.   20
quality. Thus, apartments in the catchment areas of high-scoring schools tend to sell at a 
higher price, relative to the price quote, than apartments in the catchment areas of lower-
scoring schools, reinforcing our main results.
15 
There may be an endogeneity problem associated with the use of price quotes. If price quotes 
are set high, the time to sell is likely to increase, and an apartment with a high price quote set 
before the publication becomes more likely to be sold postpublication. However, for this to 
explain our findings in this section, this must be correlated with the school quality indicators, 
and there is no a priori reason for this to be the case. Furthermore, most sales we study, and 
certainly most when we limit the sample to the two weeks surrounding publication, are sold 
shortly after price quotes are set. For these apartments, time to sell probably to a large degree 
results from day of the week variations (many apartments are displayed on the weekend and 
sold on Monday or Tuesday), and we are less likely to have a problem with endogeneity. Still, 
we also repeated the analyses presented in Table 5, while controlling for time to sell. This 
hardly had any impact on the results presented above, and we thus conclude that endogeneity 
in time to sell is unlikely to influence our results.
16 
Table 5: Sale price relative to price quote, dependent variable is log of sales price to 
price quote ratio. Date is date of sale, and the sample is restricted to apartments with 
price quote set before November 18, 2005 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















          
0.203 0.123 0.099 0.114 0.113 0.088 0.097 0.090  A
tj DQ  
[3.40]**  [2.05]*  [2.05]*  [2.74]** [3.16]** [2.88]** [3.23]** [2.85]** 
–0.012 –0.006 –0.014 –0.014  –0.02  –0.027 –0.031 –0.029  U
tj DQ  
[0.55] [0.25] [0.67] [0.77] [1.28] [1.79]  [2.34]*  [2.20]* 
          
#  obs.  480  793  1056 1306 2266 3581 6195  10936 
R
2  0.21 0.20 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 
# obs. pre publ.  230  460  695  920  1845  3084  5675  10413 
#  obs.  post  publ.  250 333 361 386 421 497 520 523 
Notes: Columns 1 through 8 report coefficients of OLS regressions for different time windows. Absolute value 
of t statistics based on catchment area clustered standard errors in brackets. All estimations control for size, year 
of construction (dummies), week fixed effects, and catchment area fixed effects. * significant at, or below, 5%; 
** significant at, or below, 1%. 
 
                                                 
15 We have also separately studied the price quotes set before the publication date, as done for price in Table 3, 
finding no significant correlation between adjusted school quality and log price quote. 
16 These results are not reported, but are available upon request.   21
 
As a final robustness check, we also run placebo regressions for this specification, reported in 
Table 6. Once again, the publication effect stands out compared with placebo publication 
effects. For eight-week time windows and longer we never find as high t-values in placebo 
regressions as we do at the actual publication date. Furthermore for the most narrow time 
window, which in this case may be the most relevant one, less than one percent of the placebo 
effects are positive and as statistically significant as the actual estimated publication effect. 
Table 6: Estimated “placebo publication effects” relative to the actual publication effect. 









|tplacebo| ≥ t18Nov2005 
(percent)  tplacebo ≥ t18Nov2005 (percent) 
± 1  0.203 3.40  3.27  0.38 
± 2  0.123 2.05  15.61  1.56 
± 3  0.099 2.05  13.35  0.89 
± 4  0.114 2.74  5.72  0.00 
± 6  0.104 2.75  4.44  0.00 
± 8  0.113 3.16  1.81  0.00 
± 10  0.092 2.92  3.83  0.00 
± 13  0.088 2.88  4.71  0.00 
Notes: Placebo publication effects are based on estimations from all dates from January 1, 2003 onwards, until 
the last date that does not include November 18, 2005. Regressions are based only on observations with price 
quotes set before placebo publication date. All estimations control for size, year of construction (dummies), 
week fixed effects, and catchment area fixed effects. 
 
From the above analysis, it is not obvious whether home buyers, home sellers, or both react to 
new information on school quality. By studying price quotes set shortly before and after 
publication, we may get further information on which mechanisms are driving the price 
response. In Table 7 we present analyses similar to those in Table 2, but using price quotes as 
the dependent variable. We find weaker housing market reactions to the publication than we 
did when studying prices. For the narrowest window, the effect is essentially zero, and for all 
intervals narrower than ± 26 weeks we find smaller coefficients than for prices. Given the 
limited samples in the narrowest time intervals, we do not get precise results, making strong 
conclusions difficult. However, the fact that we did find a significant first week effect 
comparing prices with price quotes of sold apartments and no effect for price quotes indicate 
that home buyers are primarily driving the housing market response.   22
Table 7: Housing market reaction to publication of school quality indicators. The 
dependent variable is log price quote. Dates are price quote dates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 

















          
–0.004  0.080 0.124 0.074 0.099 0.116 0.068 0.040  A
tj DQ  
[0.03] [0.70] [1.59] [1.03] [1.72]  [2.50]*  [2.26]*  [1.47] 
0.105  0.038  0.019 –0.003  –0.007 –0.01  0.004 –0.007  U
tj DQ  
[1.98] [1.03] [0.60] [0.16] [0.38] [0.58] [0.30] [0.54] 
          
#  obs.  487  911  1281 1631 2804 5271  10968  21753 
R
2  0.90 0.88 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.86 0.87 
# obs. pre publ.  230  460  695  920  1845  3084  5675  10413 
# obs. post publ.  257  451  586  711  959  2187  5293  11340 
Notes: Columns 1 through 8 report coefficients of OLS regressions for different time windows. Absolute value 
of t statistics based on catchment area clustered standard errors in brackets. All estimations control for size, year 
of construction (dummies), week fixed effects, and catchment area fixed effects. * significant at, or below, 5%; 
** significant at, or below, 1%. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper applies a clean identification strategy to investigate household valuation of school 
quality. We find a strong short-term response to first time publication of school quality 
indicators, suggesting that households value better-scoring schools. As only parents (or 
potential parents) are expected to have a fundamental preference for school quality, we find it 
reasonable to assume that parental valuation of school quality is the main driving force behind 
the housing market reaction. However, other households expecting parental valuation to 
change may also adjust their willingness to pay. In future research we aim to further 
investigate different households’ valuation of school quality by analyzing changes in 
migration flows around the time of publication. 
The impact of the change in the information environment is robust to a number of sensitivity 
checks, but the publication effect does not seem to be permanent. We point to heuristic biases 
known from behavioral finance as one plausible explanation. The housing market seems to 
respond quickly to salient information, and then reverts to prepublication valuations 
dominated by other characteristics as the school quality becomes less salient.   23
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics, by school 









Price per sq. 
meter (1000 
NOK) 
Size  Year of 
construction
ALL 38562  0.10  0.20  14.33  28.0  66  1949 
         
School  1  627 –0.21 0.05 13.98 16.4  76  1973 
School  2  460 –0.05 0.10 14.03 17.2  77  1983 
School  3  412 –0.02 0.09 14.07 17.6  78  1976 
School  4  450 –0.16 0.10 14.03 17.7  75  1975 
School  5  244 –0.07 0.26 14.05 17.9  74  1993 
School  6  323 –0.04 0.00 14.15 18.5  77  1990 
School  7  469 –0.06 0.11 14.15 18.5  80  1972 
School 8  189  0.11  0.15  13.97  18.7  67  1977 
School 9  266  0.10  0.31  14.21  19.0  86  1974 
School  10  497 –0.34 0.12 14.09 19.5  71  1976 
School  11  322 –0.22 0.07 14.15 19.7  75  1956 
School  12  516 –0.29 0.11 14.00 19.9  67  1973 
School  13  349 –0.07 0.13 14.10 20.3  73  1977 
School 14  63  0.08  –0.01  14.19  21.1  73  1979 
School  15  1361 –0.05 0.29 14.08 21.5  65  1970 
School 16  802  0.16  0.15  13.94  21.6  58  1965 
School  17  853  –0.17 –0.01 14.04  22.0  60  1958 
School  18  845 –0.01 0.19 14.11 22.1  63  1968 
School  19  360 –0.16 0.17 14.14 22.6  64  1957 
School 20  1147  0.04  0.11  14.13  23.2  61  1958 
School 21  522  0.14  0.22  14.21  23.6  65  1971 
School 22  990  0.23  0.24  14.20  23.6  65  1963 
School 23  109  0.28  0.21  14.20  24.0  63  1961 
School 24  118  0.52  0.26  14.18  24.0  63  1968 
School 25  737  0.30  0.22  14.24  25.9  62  1959 
School 26  1562  0.08  0.17  14.24  26.2  62  1954 
School 27  388  0.59  0.21  14.48  27.3  78  1967 
School 28  710  0.38  0.04  14.45  27.9  72  1968 
School 29  402  0.23  0.09  14.46  28.2  74  1960 
School 30  453  0.42  0.03  14.76  29.0  95  1981 
School  31  2672 –0.33 0.14 14.30 29.2  60  1944 
School 32  1397  0.19  0.20  14.19  29.4  52  1944 
School 33  486  0.48  0.09  14.41  29.5  65  1964 
School  34  4242 –0.04 0.28 14.31 30.7  57  1929 
School 35  3227  0.07  0.24  14.30  30.8  56  1944 
School 36  596  0.56  0.25  14.36  31.8  60  1960 
School 37  320  0.46  0.06  14.74  32.8  86  1974 
School 38  2844  0.37  0.24  14.53  34.1  67  1923 
School 39  1904  0.34  0.24  14.66  35.0  75  1928 
School 40  1370  0.38  0.19  14.73  35.3  82  1931 
School 41  1629  0.18  0.29  14.66  35.8  74  1941 
School 42  1329  0.40  0.39  14.78  35.9  87  1920   26
Table A2: Summary statistics 
   Mean Std.  dev. 
Price (1000 NOK, including financial liability)   1810  837 
Price per sq. meter (1000 NOK, including financial liability)  28.04  8.64 
Log(Price) (including financial liability)  14.33  0.38 
Log(Price quote) (including financial liability)  14.27  0.39 
Log(Price/price quote)  0.05  0.07 
U
j Q   0.10 0.24 
A
j Q   0.20 0.09 
Size (sq. meter)  66.49  25.65 
Year of construction:     
 Before 1900  0.13   
 Between 1900 and 1919  0.06   
 Between 1920 and 1939  0.19   
 Between 1940 and 1959  0.22   
 Between 1960 and 1979  0.24   
 Between 1980 and 1989  0.08   
 Between 1990 and 1999  0.04   
 After 2000  0.04   
Table A3: Attrition 
 Change  Observations 
Original data set    79322 
    
No valid residential address  –3190  76748 
No unique secondary school  –6547  69585 
Both indicators not published for school  –4750  64835 
Missing one or more variables:  –25175  39660 
 Date of sale  –18716   
 Price  –4381   
 Price quote  –14745   
 Area  –8464   
 Year of construction  –8252   
High or low price, relative to price quote  –312  39348 
Negative or very high time to sell  786  38562 
Notes: Some observations are missing several variables, thus the listing in italics is not mutually exclusive, and 
the number of unique transactions excluded sum to the number indicated above.   27
Figure A1: Number of transactions 
 
Notes: Transactions per week. Date of publication (November 18, 2005) being day one of week zero, indicated 
with vertical line.   28
Figure A2: Number of transactions 
 
Notes: Transactions per week. Date of publication (November 18, 2005) being day one of week zero. Leftmost 
vertical line denotes date of publication, rightmost denotes New Year. CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see www.cesifo-group.org/wp 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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